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JUDICIAL USURPATION OF PUBLIC UTILITY
RATE MAKING -UNION ELECTRIC
COMPANY V. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION
Public utility rate regulation in the United States has been subjected to
three stages of government control: the legislative phase, the judicial phase,
and finally, the administrative phase.' In Munn v. Illinois,2 decided in
1876, the United States Supreme Court recognized the need for and con-
stitutionality of legislative control of public utility rates. The Court held that
public service businesses were subject to special statutory price-fixing regu-
lations, 3 and thus marked the beginning of the legislative phase. It soon
became aplarent, however, that the state legislatures did not have the spe-
cial competence necessary to make fine economic adjustments in rate regula-
tion, 4 and, thus, the judiciary assumed control over the process. In Smyth v.
Ames, 5 a landmark rate case decided in 1898, the United States Supreme
Court exercised its newly-recognized control over the ratemaking function
when it established a guideline 6 that legislatures must follow in making rate
determinations. Smyth indicated that failure to adhere to the guideline
would result in a judicial denial of a legislated rate order. 7
The creation of state regulatory agencies in 1907B facilitated the efficient
implementation of the Smyth guideline and marked the beginning of the
1. See Welch, Status of Regulatory Commissions Under the Hope Natural Gas Decision, 32
CEO. L.J. 136, 136 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Welch].
2. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). The Munn Court faced the issue of whether the Illinois legislature
had the power to limit or fix the price of elevator service in a grain warehouse. The Court
affirmed the legislature's power and for the first time recognized the existence of a public util-
ity. Id. at 126. See J. BAUER & N. GOLD, PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION 26-29 (1934) [hereinaf-
ter cited as BAUER & GOLD]; J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY
OF LAW 221-22 (1927) [hereinafter cited as DICKINSON].
3. 94 U.S. at 126.
4. See Welch, supra note 1, at 136.
5. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The Smyth Court held that railroad freight rates fixed by the
legislature were confiscatory and as such violated the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution.
6. See note 35 and accompanying text infra.
7. 169 U.S. at 550.
8. See Welch, supra note 1, at 136. In 1907, New York and Wisconsin became the first
states to establish full-powered public service commissions. By 1915, Delaware was the only
state that had not established some kind of public utility agency. Id. In Smyth, the Court
recognized the need for regulatory agencies when it stated that the questions of compensation
and due process "could be more easily determined by a commission composed of persons whose
special skill, observation and experience" qualified them to do justice to the complex problem.
169 U.S. at 567.
Regulatory agencies are able to provide prompt and preventative action rather than the
merely remedial action attainable through the courts. See DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 14-21.
See also J. CHAMBERLAIN, JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 224
(1942) [hereinafter cited as CHAMBERLAIN]; 2 B. WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUB-
LIC SERVICE COMPANIES § 1402 (1911) [hereinafter cited as WYMAN]. Regulatory agencies also
employ staffs experienced and knowledgeable in the area of ratemaking. See CHAMBERLAIN at
224-34. But see Levin, Illinois Public Utility Law and the Consumer: A Proposal to Redress the
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administrative phase. By the nature of their specialized function, regulatory
agencies proved to be better able than courts to make the continuous
adjustments necessary to conform rates to changing economic conditions. 9
It was in 1913 that Illinois entered the administrative phase of public utility
regulation with the creation of the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commis-
sion) 10 and the enactment of the Public Utilities Act." The Act delineates
the powers and responsibilities of the Commission, 1 2 as well as the scope of
judicial review. 13
The Commission's statutory ratemaking authority was first defined by the
Illinois Supreme Court in State Public Utilities Commission v. Springfield
Gas & Electric Co. 14 Confronted with the utility's complaint that rates es-
tablished by the Commission were unreasonable, the Springfield Gas court
looked to the Public Utilities Act to determine the powers and duties of the
Commission in regard to ratemaking. In particular, the court focused on the
word "value" in section 30 of the Act 15 and construed it to mean "fair
value." 16 To implement this construction, the court established what has
Imbalance, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 280 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Levin] (because the Com-
mission staff must respond to the wishes of the Commissioners and hearing officer, the staff is,
in turn, influenced by the political views of these supervisors).
9. See Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Commerce Comm'n, 1 Ill. 2d 509, 116 N.E.2d 394
(1953). The Commission's proceedings are only quasi-judicial. Its orders do not have res judicata
effect and may be altered when circumstances require. Id. at 513, 116 N.E.2d at 397.
10. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1 (1979). See also Tarrel, Illinois Commerce Commis-
sion, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 779 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tarrel]. The author articulates the
major function of the Commission to be regulation of the intrastate activities of public utilities
pursuant to the Public Utilities Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 112%, §§ 1-95 (1979). Furthermore,
the Commission is to regulate the activities of electric cooperatives pursuant to the provisions of
the Electric Supplier Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 401-416 (1979), and motor carriers
pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois Motor Carrier of Property Law, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
95%, §§ 18-100 (1979). Tarrel, supra, at 779.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 1-95 (1979). The court in Kennedy v. State Public
Utilities Comm'n, 286 I11. 490, 494, 122 N.E. 111, 112 (1919) stated: "The whole object of the
Act is to secure to the public proper and efficient service by public utilities at uniform and
reasonable rates."
12. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text infra.
14. 291 I11. 209, 125 N.E. 894 (1919). The Springfield Gas court considered the question
whether the Public Utilities Commission proceeded legally in establishing Springfield Gas
Company's rates, and whether the Commission's decision was supported by the manifest weight
of the evidence. Id. at 213, 125 N.E. at 895. The court concluded that the Commission had
wholly excluded the element known as "going value" from its conclusion, and remanded the
case to the Commission for further proceedings. Id. at 237, 125 N.E. at 902.
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 30 (1979), states in pertinent part: "The Commission shall
have power to ascertain the value of the property of every public utility in this State and every
fact which in its judgment may or does have any bearing on its value." Id.
16. 291 Iii. at 222, 125 N.E. at 897. The court stated: "We consider any value a fair value
which fair and reasonable men would say ought to be attached to the property, under all the
circumstances of the particular case, for the purpose of measuring a return which the public
should pay to the owner." Id.
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been termed a "fair value guideline", 17 similar to that adopted in Smyth,
which the Commission was required to follow in computing utility rate
bases. Because the court recognized a need for Commission autonomy in the
ratemaking process, I8 it did not formulate the guideline in restrictive or in-
flexible terms. Rather, the court emphasized that while the Commission
must consider certain enumerated factors, it did not have to assign these
factors a particular weight, or any weight, in the final rate determination. 19
Subsequent Illinois Supreme Court decisions, 20 while advocating adherence
to Springfield Gas, have slowly eroded that decision's foundation so that the
fair value guideline 2 ' has become a strict formula operating to usurp the
Commission's role as the ratemaking authority.22
In Union Electric Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission,23 the most recent
Illinois Supreme Court rate base decision, the court continued the erosion of
the guideline when it required the Commission to use, 24 not just to con-
sider,2 5 particular elements in its rate base determinations. By doing so, the
court misapplied Springfield Gas, infringed upon the powers of the Commis-
sion, and violated the letter and spirit of the Public Utilities Act. 26
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the Illinois Supreme
Court in Union Electric adversely affected three branches of the state
government by exceeding the statutory bounds of judicial review and by
engaging in judicial ratemaking. The Note traces the Illinois court's erosion
of the Springfield Gas guideline, and the concomitant development of a re-
strictive formula. It also discusses the negative role that stare decisis has
played in giving impetus to and maintaining that erosion. Finally, it analyzes
the crippling effects that a strict rate base formula has on the Commission's
ability to balance conflicting utility and consumer interests in an inflationary
economy.
17. Id. at 219, 125 N.E. at 896. The court stated that in order to ascertain value, the
Commission must consider the original cost of construction, the amount spent on permanent
improvements, the present cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property
under the rates prescribed, and the amount needed to meet operating expenses. In its final
computation, the Commission must give to each of these factors the particular weight which it
feels is just in each case. Id.
18. Id. at 213, 125 N.E. at 894. The court stated: "The law is settled in this State that the
matter of rate regulation is essentially that of legislative control. The fixing of rates is not a
judicial function ...."
19. Id. at 222, 125 N.E. at 897.
20. City of Alton v. Commerce Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 76, 165 N.E.2d 513 (1960); Illinois Bell
Tel. Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 414 II1. 275, 111 N.E.2d 329 (1953). See notes 127-140 and
accompanying text infra.
21. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
22. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text infra.
23. 77 I11. 2d 364, 396 N.E.2d 510 (1979).
24. See notes 79-94 and accompanying text infra.
25. See note 17 supra.
26. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text infra.
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PHASE
The administrative phase of rate regulation evolved from three major
United States Supreme Court decisions: Munn v. Illinois,2 7 Smyth v.
Ames, 28 and Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 2 9 In
Munn, the Court recognized the need for legislative rate regulation of
businesses that are vested with a special public interest. 30 Consequently,
legislatures began to formulate price-fixing statutes and provisions for fran-
chise agreements, and to engage in other similar direct legislative action,
none of which was subjected to judicial review.3 1 Any relief from unreason-
able rates was obtainable solely through the electoral process and not
through the courts.
Eventually, claims based upon the alleged imposition of confiscatory rates
by utilities invoked judicial review 32 under the constitutional guarantees of
due process 33 and compensation for taking of private property. 34 Address-
ing the issue of confiscation, Smyth signaled the end of absolute legislative
control over the ratemaking process. The Smyth Court held that the fixing of
nonconfiscatory rates for utilities required the legislature to consider a
number of cost and value factors. 35 In effect, the judiciary established the
rate base method by which legislatures were to determine utility rates.
27. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
28. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
29. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). At issue in Hope was the validity of a rate order issued by the
Federal Power Commission which reduced Hope Natural Gas Company's rates. The Court held
that it would not disturb rate orders or allow review on constitutional grounds except under
very narrow circumstances. The circumstances were enumerated as follows: (1) the burden of
proof is on the utility to rebut the very strong presumption that the commission's order is not
confiscatory; and (2)' the utility must demonstrate that the end result of the order is either
unreasonable or unjust because it interferes with the successful operation of the company, or
would put the company's continued operation in jeopardy. Id. at 602. The Hope Court firmly
established that no judicial review would be undertaken merely because the Federal Power
Commission followed an erroneous method. Id. Hope did not, however, overrule Smyth; rather,
it simply nullified Smyth's effect by limiting the Court's review of commission orders to the end
result. Id.
30. 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876). The Court defined a utility as property devoted to a public use
and operated in the nature of a natural monopoly. Id. at 126.
31. See Welch, supra note 1, at 136.
32. See St. Louis & San Francisco BR. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649 (1895) (recognizing right to
judicial review of legislation establishing tariff rates which are so unreasonable as to practically
destroy the value of the property); Reagan v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1893)
(the rates fixed by the Railroad Commission of Texas were unjust and unreasonable).
33. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1922); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Reagan v.
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1893).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
35. 169 U.S. at 546-47. The basis of all calculations of rates must be the fair value of the
property being used by it for public use. To ascertain that value, the legislature should consider
the utility's original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the
1122 [Vol. 29:1119
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For over 70 years, the method by which rate bases 3 6 are determined has
been a topic of controversy. Primarily, this controversy revolves around the
propriety of three possible methods of rate base measurement: original cost,
reproduction cost, and fair value. Favored by commissions for its systematic
administration, the original cost method calculates rate of return utilizing the
amount initially invested to construct and commence operation of the util-
ity. 37  By contrast, the reproduction cost method is based on the amount
required to replace the property as it exists.3 8 Finally, the fair value
method incorporates considerations of both original cost and reproduction
cost, as well as numerous other relevant factors. 39 Computation under this
last method requires that the ratemaking body first consider all factors and
then delegate to each a particular weight so as to arrive at a return that will
be fair to all interested parties. 4 0
Although the method of computing utility rate bases remains a topic of
controversy at the state court level,4 1 it has been resolved at the federal
amount and market value of its stocks and bonds and the probable earning capacity of the utility
under prescribed rates after deducting operating expenses. Id.
36. See 1 J. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 139-41, 190 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as PRIEST]. "Rate base" represents the total investment in, or fair value of, the
facilities used by a utility in providing its service. That rate base figure is multiplied by a
percentage called "rate of return" to arrive at the allowed return which the utility has an oppor-
tunity to earn. If, for example, the rate base is $1,000,000 and the rate of return is 6%, the
amount which the utility has an opportunity to earn is $60,000 per year. Id. at 139.
37. Id. at 141. Utility company records are concrete evidence of capital interest; they are
not based upon speculative physical valuation of the property. A majority of the state regulatory
agencies have adopted this method and it has been either expressly or impliedly approved by
the reviewing courts in 38 jurisdictions. See Union Elec. Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 77 I11. 2d
364, 379, 396 N.E.2d 510, 517 (1979). Opponents of the original cost method point out its
unfair results during periods of inflation and its adverse effects upon the return of public
utilities, including loss in purchasing power, decreased real value of depreciation allowances,
attrition, and regulatory lag. See Note, Original Cost Rate Regulation and Inflation, 66 HARV.
L. REv. 1274 (1953). Attrition or erosion of the rate of return is the tendency of the rate of
return to diminish in a period of comparatively high construction costs. See New England Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 331 Mass. 604, 121 N.E.2d 896 (1954). Regulatory lag
is the loss of proper earnings claimed by the utility between the time when a petition for a rate
increase is filed and when the rate actually becomes effective by administrative or judicial
determination. See State v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 30 N.J. 16, 152 A.2d 35 (1959).
38. See PRIEST, supra note 36, at 140. Advocates of the reproduction cost method contend
that it best allows utilities to keep up with the effects of inflation and attract investors. See
WYMAN, supra note 8, § 111. But see Levin, supra note 8, at 271 (the reproduction cost
method provides utilities with a windfall during inflationary periods). Adversaries of the method
have rejected it as being too theoretical and expensive. See BAUER & GOLD, supra note 2, at
109; PRIEST, supra note 36, at 168; Tarrel, supra note 10, at 788-89.
39. See Tarrel, supra note 10, at 788-89. Relevant factors which the Commission must con-
sider include: current economic conditions, current price levels, operating revenues, operating
expenses, working capital requirements, reserves, and reasonable return to the investor. Id.
40. See PRIEST, supra note 36, at 140; Tarrel, supra note 10, at 788-89. This method is
thought to be the most flexible because commissions are able to exercise their expert discretion
in arriving at a return that is neither confiscatory to the utility nor extortionate to the consumer.
See generally Levin, supra note 8.
41. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text infra.
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level by the United States Supreme Court decision, Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Hope Natural Gas Co.4 2  In Hope, the Court held that if the total
effect of the Federal Power Commission's order was just and reasonable,
there was no need for judicial inquiry. 43  Thus, judicial focus shifted from
the particular method used to the reasonableness of the resulting rate."
Although binding upon federal courts, the Hope decision is not binding upon
state courts that review their own commissions' intrastate rate orders. 45  In-
stead, the scope of judicial review at the state level is delineated in state
public utility acts. 46
As previously noted,4 7 Illinois entered the administrative phase of utility
rate regulation in 1913 with the enactment of the Public Utilities Act.48 The
Act contains over thirty provisions that contain the powers and responsibilities
of the Commission and the utilities. 49 Among the powers delegated to the
Commission is the authority to ascertain the value of the property of every
public utility in the state as well as every fact which, in its judgment, has
any bearing on that value. 50 Furthermore, the Commission is authorized to
establish the rates or other charges, rules, or regulations which it finds just
and reasonable. 51
42. 320 U.S. at 602. See note 29 supra.
43. 320 U.S. at 602.
44. id.
45. The Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1965), mandates that decisions of state commissions
fixing utility rates be reviewed in state courts.
46. See, e.g., Public Utilities Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 1-95 (1979); Public Service
Comm'n Act of 1913, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-2-1 to 120 (1973); Public Utilities Act, KY. REV.
STAT. § 278 (1971); Public Utilities Act, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35, §§ 2301-2341 (1964); Public
Utilities Act, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 25, §§ 1-12 (1973); MICH. CoMp. LAws §§ 460.51-.62
(1970). Federal commissions are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706 (1970). The Administrative Procedure Act applies only to agencies operating under
the authority of the federal government; thus, state regulated agencies are excluded. Id.
at § 701(b)(1).
47. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, §9 1-95 (1979).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, 9§ 32-63 (1979). See Tarrel, supra note 10. The author
relates the history of utility rate regulation agencies in general and describes the duties of the
Illinois Commerce Commission in particular. The author also follows the steps of a rate proceed-
ing from the filing of the utility's rate increase request to the Commission's final rate deter-
mination and subsequent judicial appeal. Id. at 786-791.
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ill.%, § 30 (1979).
51. Id. § 36. Section 36 states in pertinent part:
Whenever there shall be filed with the Commission any schedule stating an indi-
vidual or joint rate or other charge, classification, contract, practice, rule or regula-
tion, the Commission shall have power .. .to enter upon a hearing concerning the
propriety of such rate or other charge, classification, contract, practice, rule or regu-
lation, and pending the hearing and decision thereon, such rate or other charge,
classification, contract, practice, rule or regulation shall not go into effect.
Id. In addition, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 41 (1979) states: "[T]he Commission shall deter-
mine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates or other charges, classifications, rules, regulations,
contracts or practices to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order as
hereinafter provided." Id.
1124 [Vol. 29:1119
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Regarding the judicial scope of review, the Act expressly restricts the
courts to a determination of reasonableness and lawfulness.5 2 Questions of
fact are clearly matters for the Commission to decide and its findings are to
be held prima facie correct. 53  In addition, a Commission order cannot be
set aside unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence.5 4
In effect, the Act foreshadowed the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Hope 55 which limited judicial review of Commission orders to the reason-
ableness of the result rather than expanding it to include the factual deter-
minations leading to that result. Despite this substantive similarity,
however, the Union Electric court purported to adhere to the Act while
concurrently dismissing Hope as irrelevant precedent. 56
THE UNION ELECTIC DECISION
Facts and Proceedings
Union Electric was a consolidated case, originating as two separate actions
filed by Union Electric Company 57 and Illinois Bell Telephone Company. 58
Each utility sought judicial review of rate increase determinations made by
the Illinois Commerce Commission.
At its hearings before the Commission, Union Electric presented evidence
supporting both the net original cost and reproduction cost 59 methods of
52. Id. § 72. See, e.g., Monarch Gas Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 51 11. App. 3d 892,
894-95, 366 N.E.2d 945, 946-47 (3d Dist. 1977); Central Ill. Light Co. v. Commerce Comm'n,
10 I11. App. 3d 370, 378, 294 N.E.2d 89, 95 (3d Dist. 1973). See WYMAN, supra note 8, § 1125;
Tarrel, supra note 10, at 785.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 72 (1979).
54. Id. See, e.g., Village of Milford v. Commerce Comm'n, 20 II. 2d 556, 561, 170 N.E.2d
576, 579 (1960); State Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec.
Co., 291 I11. 209, 213-14, 125 N.E. 891, 894 (1919); Sunset Trails Water Co. v. Commerce
Comm'n, 7 I11. App. 3d 449, 456, 287 N.E.2d 736, 740 (3d Dist. 1972).
55. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
56. 77 Ill. 2d at 371, 396 N.E.2d at 514.
57. Union Elec. Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 64 I11. App. 3d 700, 381 N.E.2d 1002 (3d Dist.
1978).
58. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 64 III. App. 3d 645, 381 N.E.2d 999 (3d
Dist. 1978).
59. See Brief for Respondents-Appellees, Cerro Copper Products at 11, 13, Union Elec. Co.
v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 77 1ll.2d 364, 396 N.E.2d 510 (1979). Union Electric's estimate,
based on net original cost, recommended a valuation of $204,297,000 on which it sought a 9%
rate of return. Union Electric also submitted a reproduction cost valuation of $403,082,000. It
then proceeded to weight the original cost rate base at 70% and the current value or repro-
duction cost rate base at 30% to arrive at what it represented as the "fair value." Id. The
percentage weightings were based on Union Electric's capitalization ratios on December 31,
1975, of 70% fixed dollar capital (bonds and preferred stock) and 30% common equity. Id.
Union Electric asked for an approximate rate of return of 70% on the fair value figure which
would approximate a 9% return on the lower original cost rate base. Id. Interestingly, the
utility itself was not particularly concerned with which method was used as long as the result
was reasonable. Id.
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rate determination. The Commission considered the various elements of
each method 6" and determined that Union Electric's rate base would be
computed on what the utility represented as original cost.6 1  In arriving at
the final rate, the Commission also considered the fact that Union offered
identical service from the same facility to both Illinois and Missouri resi-
dents. 6 2 Thus, to avoid discriminatory ratefixing,6 3 the Commission set
Illinois rates that were comparable to those charged in Missouri.64 Union
Electric objected to synchronizing the two rates 6 5 and appealed to the cir-
cuit court 6 6 claiming that section 38 of the Act, governing rate dis-
crimination, had been misapplied. 67
The circuit court interpreted Illinois law as providing that original cost is
only an element, not the single dispositive factor, in determining utility rate
bases. Thus, the court held that because the Commission had merely con-
sidered, and not used, reproduction cost factors in its final computation, the
Commission had improperly ignored essential evidence and had violated the
law. 68
60. 64 III. App. 3d at 711, 381 N.E.2d at 1010. In computing Union Electric's rate base, the
Commission considered the following: evidence of current value, cost of construction work in
progress, Union Electric's capital structure, problems emanating from the downgrading of
Union Electric's bond rating and other factors relating to current economic conditions. The
appellate court noted that in the companion case, Illinois Bell Tel. Co., the Commission also
demonstrated that it had considered current economic conditions in arriving at the final rate.
id.
61. See note 59 supra. The Commission rejected replacement cost evidence in favor of a
more realistic, ascertainable measure of value founded upon original cost. 64 Il1. App. 3d at 711,
381 N.E.2d at 1010.
62. Id. at 702-03, 381 N.E.2d at 1004. Union Electric is a Missouri corporation which serv-
ices Missouri, Iowa and three areas of Illinois. The population of the Illinois service area is
about 262,000. The Missouri and Iowa service areas consist of 1,943,000 and 47,000 persons
respectively. That a substantial number of Union Electric's 739,000 customers are in Missouri is
evidenced by the fact that only 70,000 are in Illinois and only 16,000 are in Iowa. Id.
63. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111%, § 38 (1979) governs the responsibility of the Commission to
avoid discriminatory rates. Section 38 states in pertinent part: "No public utility shall establish
or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates or other charges, services, facilities, or in
any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service." Id.
In PRIEST, supra note 36, at 301-02, the author notes that a difference in rates is not undue
or unlawful discrimination per se. Discrimination is a regulatory determination of fact which
must be made on a case-by-case basis. Id.
64. 64 II1. App. 3d at 712-13, 381 N.E.2d at 1010-11; Brief for Respondents-Appellees at 12.
65. Brief for Respondents-Appellees at 12.
66. Utilities' right to appeal is provided by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 68 (1979):
Complaint may be made by the commission, of its own motion or by any person or
corporation .. .by petition or complaint in writing, setting forth any act or things
done in violation, or claimed to be in violation, of any provision of this Act, or of
any order or rule of the commission.
67. 64 I11. App. 3d at 712, 381 N.E.2d at 1010. Union Electric argued that section 38 does
not have extraterritorial effect, and thus cannot be used as authority to synchronize rates in
different states. Id. See note 63 supra.
68. Brief for Respondents-Appellees at 13.
1126
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Regarding the synchronization of Missouri and Illinois rates, the circuit
court held that section 38 of the Act did not require the Illinois Commerce
Commission to conform Illinois rates to those charged by utilities in
neighboring states. 69 Therefore, the court held, the Commission had erred
in substituting the Missouri commission's judgment for its own. 70 The cause
was remanded to the Commission and the Commission appealed. 71 Based on
similar facts, the circuit court also remanded the Commission's rate increase
order for Illinois Bell Telephone Company. 72  The Commission, again, ap-
pealed.
Because of the similarity in facts, the appellate court treated Union Elec-
tric and Illinois Bell as companion cases. 73 The appellate court reversed the
circuit court decisions and held that the Commission is only required to
consider reproduction cost; it is not required to rely on that cost. 7 4 In both
cases, the appellate court reasoned that the Commission had properly re-
ceived and considered evidence relating to the various factors comprising a
fair value 75 rate base and had applied sound business judgment 76 to arrive
at an equitable rate. In addition, the appellate court upheld the Commis-
sion's order that Union Electric's Missouri and Illinois rates must be syn-
69. Id.
70. The circuit court noted that the Commission could properly take administrative notice of
the rates set up by the Missouri Public Service Commission and introduce those rates as evi-
dence in its own final determination. Id.
71. Union Elec. Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 64 I11. App. 3d 700, 381 N.E.2d 1002 (3d Dist.
1978).
72. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 64 I1. App. 3d 645, 381 N.E.2d 999 (3d
Dist. 1978). Illinois Bell claimed that the rate increase granted by the Commission was in-
sufficient. The Commission's determination allowed a return on Illinois Bell's original cost base.
After it had considered evidence of reproduction cost, the Commission dismissed this evidence
and the theory upon which it rested as a "complex methodology prepared by parties unknown
using data not available for scrutiny .. " Brief for Respondents-Appellees at 14 (quoting In re
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 59666 (11. Commerce Comm'n 1976)). The Commission denied Il-
linois Bell's request for a rehearing. Illinois Bell then filed an appeal with the Circuit Court of
Sangamon County. Id. The circuit court held that the Commission's use of an original cost rate
base was contrary to Illinois law and the Commission's order was reversed and remanded. Id.
73. 64 III. App. 3d at 648, 381 N.E.2d at 1001.
74. Id. The Illinois Bell court stated:
In this case, considerable evidence of current economic conditions, including "cur-
rent value" was considered by the Commerce Commission; in its discretion, a rate
base value founded on original cost was chosen. We find the Commission acted
within the scope of its statutory authority in determining the value of Illinois Bell's
property.
Id. In Union Electric, the court stated: "The cases do not suggest that the Commission must
pay slavish obedience to reproduction cost estimates in determining value. Reproduction cost is
but one factor of current economic conditions." 64 III. App. 3d at 712, 381 N.E.2d at 1011.
75. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
76. See State Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co.,
291 I11. 209, 222, 125 N.E. 891, 904 (1919). In this case the Illinois Supreme Court first articu-
lated the concept of sound business judgment. It established a presumption that members of
the Commission have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter through experience and
study and are the most efficient instrumentality to execute a rate determination. Id.
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chronized. In reaching its decision, the court relied upon section 41 of the
Public Utilities Act which states that the Commission has the duty to deter-
mine just and reasonable rates. 77  This duty, the court reasoned, mandates
that all rates charged by the same utility for identical services be compara-
ble, and concluded therefore that a rate disparity based solely on state
boundary lines is clearly unjust. 78
The Illinois Supreme Court's
Union Electric Opinion
Confronted with the lower courts' conflicting interpretations of Illinois law
regarding the elements to be used by the Commission in establishing public
utility rate bases, the Illinois Supreme Court in Union Electric79 looked to
previous supreme court decisions and found stare decisis conclusive of the
issue.80 Although the Union Electric court relied primarily upon State Pub-
lic Utilities Commission v. Springfield Gas & Electric Co."' for its decision,
the court did not analyze that opinion in depth. Instead, the court merely
quoted the Springfield Gas holding and relied upon subsequent case law
analyses of its scope and impact.8 2
In reconciling its decision with Illinois statutory law, the Union Electric
court implied legislative assent to the Springfield Gas construction of the
Public Utilities Act from the legislature's failure to enact amendments to
abrogate the holding of that case. 8 3 Furthermore, the court contended that
its past interpretations of the Act 8 4 had, in effect, become a part of the Act,
and to change that interpretation would be tantamount to amending the
statute.
85
In addition, the Union Electric court dismissed the Commission's claim
that it had followed the fair value guideline articulated in Springfield Gas.8 6
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 41 (1979). By contrast, the circuit court, in maldng its
determination, relied upon section 38 of the Act which concerns discriminatory rates. See note
63 and accompanying text supra.
78. 64 I1l. App. 3d at 713-14, 381 N.E.2d at 1015.
79. 77 I11. 2d 364, 396 N.E.2d 510 (1979).
80. id. at 379, 396 N.E.2d at 517.
The court relied primarily on the following precedent (in order of court discussion): State
Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 291 I11. 209, 125
N.E. 891 (1919) (see notes 121-126 and accompanying text infra); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 414 I11. 275, 111 N.E.2d 329 (1953) (see notes 127-133 and accompanying
text infra); City of Alton v. Commerce Comm'n, 19 I11. 2d 76, 165 N.E.2d 513 (1960) (see notes
134-140 and accompanying text infra).
81. 291 I11. 209, 125 N.E. 891 (1919).
82. 77 Ill. 2d at 371-80, 396 N.E.2d at 514-17. See notes 155-163 and accompanying text
infra.
83. Id. at 364, 380-81, 396 N.E.2d at 515, 517-18. See notes 148-151 and accompanying text
infra.
84. See notes 121-122 and accompanying text infra.
85. 77 II1. 2d at 380-81, 396 N.E.2d at 518.
86. 291 I11. 209, 125 N.E. 891 (1919). See note 17 supra.
1128 [Vol. 29:1119
1980] UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY 1129
The Commission alleged that it had considered all relevant factors of the
guideline8 7 and had allocated to each factor the weight which sound busi-
ness judgment dictated it should have.8 8 The court, however, concentrated
on the fact that the Commission had not allocated any weight to reproduc-
tion cost in its final rate base computation.8 9 Therefore, the court reasoned,
the Commission had not set a fair value rate base. Rather, it had violated
Illinois law by setting an original cost rate base.90
In resolving the Missouri-Illinois comparable rate issue, the Union Electric
court relied upon section 36 of the Public Utilities Act 9' which requires that
the rates set by the Commission provide a reasonable return. 92  In essence,
the court reasoned in the negative, stating that because the Act does not
authorize the Illinois Commission to defer to another state commission's
judgment, the Commission erred in giving too much weight to the Missouri
commission's rate determination. 93  For the aforementioned reasons, the
case was remanded to the Commission for incorporation of the fair value rate
base method as it was interpreted by the Union Electric court. 94
ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
Judicial Usurpation of Commission Authority
Under the guise of judicial review, the Union Electric court indulged in
judicial ratemaking and regressed to the judicial phase 95 of public utility
regulation by mandating the use of specific factors in the Commission's rate
base determinations. 96 As a result, the court's decision will have an adverse
impact on the functions, power and credibility of three branches of state
government. First, it will undermine the legislative branch by having vio-
lated the judicial review provision of the Public Utilities Act.97  Second, it
87. 77 I11. 2d at 377, 396 N.E.2d at 516. See note 60 supra.
88. 77 Ill. 2d at 377, 396 N.E.2d at 516. See note 17 supra.
89. 77 I11, 2d at 378, 396 N.E.2d at 517. See notes 38 & 61 supra.
90. 77 I11. 2d at 378, 396 N.E.2d at 517.
91. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111%, § 36 (1979). See note 51 supra. The court dismissed section
38 (discriminatory rates) as being inapplicable to the case. 77 Ill. 2d at 383, 396 N.E.2d at 519.
Furthermore, it failed to discuss section 41 (just and reasonable rates), which the appellate court
had found conclusive of the issue. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
92. See Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 436, 167
N.E.2d 414 (1960). Iowa-Illinois Gas established a standard for measuring reasonable return;
after consideration of all relevant factors, the rates fixed by the Commission should be sufficient
to provide for operating expenses, depreciation, necessary reserves, and a reasonable return to
investors. Id. at 445, 167 N.E.2d at 418-19.
93. 77 I11. 2d at 383, 396 N.E.2d at 519.
94. Id.
95. See notes 4-7 and accompanying text supra.
96. 77 Ill. 2d at 378, 396 N.E.2d at 517. The court insisted that a rejection of reproduction
cost evidence in the Commission's final determinations was tantamount to a rejection of the fair
value method. Id. Thtis, the court substituted its own factual determinations for those of the
Commission and mandated that reproduction cost be weighted in the final determination. Id.
97. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111%, § 72 (1979). See notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
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will adversely affect the administrative branch by defeating the purpose for
which the Illinois Commerce Commission was created."' Finally, the deci-
sion will affect the credibility of the judicial branch by its blind adherence to
the stare decisis doctrine 99 that served to perpetuate the erosion of the
Springfield Gas fair value guideline into a restrictive legal formula.
The Union Electric court violated the Public Utilities Act when it sub-
stituted its own judgment for the Commission's in determining the validity
of elements used to compute the fair value rate base. 100 Section 72 of the
Act 101 expressly limits judicial review to questions of law 102 such as
reasonableness and lawfulness of Commission orders. 1 0 3  In addition, section
72 states that an appeal is not to be treated as a trial de novo at which the
court reviews the evidence and makes its own factual determinations. 10 4
98. See Public Utils. Comm'n ex rel. Mitchell v. Chicago & West Towns Ry., 275 I11. 555,
114 N.E. 325 (1916). The court recognized the need for the Commission to effectuate the
purpose of the Public Utilities Act. The court stated that the Commission's first power and duty
was to establish just, reasonable and uniform rates and charges. Id. at 563, 114 N.E. at 328. See
also note 8 supra.
99. 77 Ill. 2d at 381-82, 396 N.E.2d at 518. The court cited and dismissed as inapplicable
cases in which exceptions to the stare decisis doctrine were found. In distinguishing them, the
court offered no explanation other than "clearly, none of these exceptions are applicable." Id.
The court never explained what these clearly inapplicable exceptions were. Id. In its analysis,
the court overlooked Neff v. George, 364 I11. 306, 122 NE. 316 (1936). The exception to the
stare decisis doctrine noted in Neff is clearly applicable to the Union Electric situation; the rule
of stare decisis applies "unless the evils of the principles laid down will be more injurious to the
community than can possibly result from a change." Id. at 309, 122 N.E. at 318. In Union
Electric, the community will be economically injured by rates established by use of an inflexible
formula that does not balance utility and consumer interests. See notes 108-111 & 116 and
accompanying text infra.
100, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 72 (1979). See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
See generally BAUER & GOLD, supra note 2, at 449-50; DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 17-18 &
n.29; WYMAN, supra note 8, § 1233.
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 72 (1979).
102. See Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 (1904). The Court stated:
[WIhere the decision of questions of fact is committed by Congress to the judgment
and discretion of the head of a department, his decision thereon is conclusive; and
that even upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone, his action will carry
with it a strong presumption of its correctness, and the courts will not ordinarily
review it, although they may have the power, and will occasionally exercise the
right of so doing.
Id. at 109-10.
103. See, e.g., DuPage Util. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 47 I11. 2d 550, 267 N.E.2d
662 (1971) (although a court may hold that rates authorized by the Commission are inadequate
or illegal and may restrain their enforcement, it cannot make new rates); Peoples Gas, Light &
Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 II1. 31, 25 N.E.2d 482 (1939) (the true inquiry of the court is whether
rates are confiscatory); State Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas &
Elec. Co., 291 111. 209, 125 N.E. 891 (1919) (the fixing of rates is not a judicial function);
Monarch Gas Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 51 11. App. 3d 892, 366 N.E.2d 945 (3d Dist. 1977)
(the determination of rates is historically a legislative, not a judicial, function).
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 72 (1979). See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 548 (1965). See United States Gas Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 48 II.
2d 36, 40, 268 N.E.2d 32, 34 (1971) (citing Chicago, North Shore & Milwaukee R.R. v. Con-
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Instead, questions of fact 105 are solely within the Commission's scope of
authority and are prima facie true unless clearly against the manifest weight
of the evidence. 106  Furthermore, section 30 of the Act 107 gives the Com-
mission exclusive authority to ascertain the value of utility property. In viola-
tion of these express provisions, the Union Electric court imposed its own
value determination and mandated that reproduction cost be weighted in the
final value computation.' 08 As a result, not only is the legislature's authority
compromised, but the Commission is restrained from exercising its business
judgment and utilities are assured that evidence of reproduction cost, no
matter how speculative or contradictory,' 0 9 will be given weight in the final
rate base determination. Consequently, consumers may pay increased utility
rates as inflation causes reproduction costs to spiral, 110 while utilities con-
tinue to reap a high return on an investment that costs only a fraction of its
current inflated value."' Without question, the utility must earn enough
merce Comm'n ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works & Bldgs., 354 Il. 58, 74, 188 N.E. 177, 183
(1933); Sunset Trails Water Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 7 I11. App. 3d 449, 456, 287 N.E.2d
736, 742 (3d Dist. 1972)).
105. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
106. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
107. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111%, § 30 (1979). See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
108. See note 96 supra.
109. See BAUER & GOLD, supra note 2, at 168; Tarrel, supra note 10, at 788-89.
110. In State Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co.,
291 II. 209, 125 N.E. 891 (1919), the court recognized the need to adjust rates in an in-
flationary economy to protect consumers. The court, paraphrasing Willcox v. Consolidated Gas
Co., 212 U.S. 19, 52 (1915), stated:
[T]he value of the property is to be determined as of the time when the inquiry is
made of the rates, and if the property which legally enters into the consideration of
the question of rates has increased in value since it was acquired, the company is,
as a general rule, entitled to the benefit of such increase. This would not be true,
however, where the property had increased so enormously in value as to render a
rate permitting a reasonable return upon such increased value unjust to the public.,
Id. at 220, 125 N.E. at 897.
111. See PRIEST, supra note 36, at 169-70. Particularly during an inflationary period, repro-
duction cost evidence precipitates a "windfall" to the utility and its investors. Priest illustrated
such a "windfall" with the following example:
SIMPLIFIED BALANCE SHEET AS EXAMPLE
This ultra-simplified balance sheet is offered for illustration's sake:
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Net Plant Account $1,000,000 5% Bonds $ 500,000
$6 Preferred Stock 250,000
Common Stock 250,000
$1,000,000
If we assume that our company has been allowed, and has earned, a six per cent
return on net plant account (original cost rate base), it would have $60,000 with
which to pay $25,000 of bond interest and $15,000 of preferred dividends, leaving
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money to efficiently run the company, pay investors and expand as neces-
sary. Yet these needs can be satisfied by adjusting the rate of return 112
figure instead of using reproduction cost as the rate base.
The Union Electric decision also will have an adverse impact on the ad-
ministrative branch of the government. Depriving the Commission of judi-
cial deference to its expert status defeats the very purpose for which the
Illinois Commerce Commission was created. 113 In Public Utilities Commis-
sion v. Chicago & West Towns Railway, 1 4 the Illinois Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the Commission is necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Public Utilities Act. These policies include preventing unjust discrimination,
undue preferences, and extortionate rates."l 5 The Union Electric court
acted contrary to these policies by imposing an inflexible rate formula upon
the Commission that required the use, not just the consideration, of repro-
duction cost. In effect, the court's formula tilted the scales toward the
$20,000-a return of eight per cent-for the common. Then if eighty per cent of
this amount were paid out in common dividends, the yield would be 6.4 per cent,
which would not be an over-generous return.
Now assume that the company's rate base is increased thirty per cent, or to
$1,300,000 by lending significance to replacement cost or trended original cost or
whatever other technique is used to give effect to existing price levels. If the same
return of six per cent were applied to that new rate base, the company would have
$78,000 of net income. Again, deducting $25,000 for bond interest and $15,000 for
preferred dividends, $38,000 would be available for the common stock-a return of
15.2 per cent. Assuming an eighty per cent pay-out of dividends, the common stock
yield would be over 12.5 per cent and that stock should perform well in the market.
Id.
112. See BAUER & GOLD, supra note 2, at 343. Because there is a distinct interdependence
between the rate base and the rate of return, the adequacy of one must be considered in
relation to the other. Id. Recognizing this interrelationship, the United States Supreme Court
has held that if both factors yield a sufficient total amount of return, the rate order will be
upheld. See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) (the rate of return was
sufficient to maintain the producer's financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate
their investors for risks assumed); Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 291
U.S. 440 (1934) (to avoid confiscation, an 8%, rather than 6%, rate of return was allowed);
United Rys. v. West, 280 U.S. 234 (1930) (a fair return in a given case is not capable of exact
mathematical demonstration); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403 (1924)
(because of the inadequate rate base, a net return of 7% was necessary to avoid confiscation);
Bluefield Water Works v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) (the rate of return must be
such as to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility); Lincoln Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256 (1919) (current interest rates or costs of capital received special con-
sideration in establishing the rate of return); Cedar Rapids Gas & Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids,
223 U.S. 655 (1912) (after consideration of the fact that the rate base was generous, the Court
found a 6% rate of return adequate).
113. See note 97 supra. See also DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 71. The author states that the
effectiveness of a commission order is directly related to the conclusiveness of its findings. Id.
Furthermore, a primary reason for commission control is to eliminate the delay which invariably
accompanies judicial review. Id.
114. 275 Ill. 555, 114 N.E. 325 (1916).
115. Id. at 563, 114 N.E. at 328.
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utility-desired high rate increase, thereby upsetting the balance between
consumer and utility11 6 and infringing upon the Commission's authority to
create and maintain that balance.
Finally, Union Elecric will have a negative impact on the credibility of the
judicial branch of the government. By citing Springfield Gas as precedent,
yet relying upon subsequent case law for its interpretation, 1 7 the Union
Electric court perpetuated the distortion of the Springfield Gas fair value
guideline into a restrictive legal formula. The court's reliance upon prece-
dent also illustrated a negative characteristic of the stare decisis doctrine. 118
While the doctrine can work in a positive manner, providing uniformity and
predictability in the law, 119 it can also work in a negative manner by per-
petuating misinterpreted or bad precedent. 120  In Union Electric, the court
relied upon a line of rate base cases each of which had eroded the original
fair value concept. The erosion has been subtle, each case adding to the
change until Union Electric completed the transformation.
As the originator of the fair value guideline, Springfield Gas, the landmark
Illinois Supreme Court rate base case, construed the term "value" in the
Public Utilities Act 121 to mean "any value ...which fair and reasonable
men would say ought to be attached to the property under all the cir-
cumstances of the particular case for the purpose of measuring a return,
which the public should pay to the owner. "122 To effectuate this construc-
tion, the Springfield Gas court established the guideline ' 2 3 which outlined
factors 124 that the Commission was to consider in determining a fair value
rate base. The guideline neither mandated the use of specific elements in
the final computation nor indicated that any particular weight must be given
to each element. 125  Instead, the Commission was required to consider all
relevant factors and apply its sound business judgment to determine which
of those factors would be given weight in the final computation. The Com-
116. See generally Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 611-12
(1944); State Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 291
I11. 209, 216-17, 125 N.E. 891, 895 (1919).
117. See notes 127-140 and accompanying text infra.
118. See note 99 supra.
119. See generally Neff v. George, 364 11. 306, 122 N.E. 316 (1936).
120. See also Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276 (1922); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 II1. 2d 11, 42 N.E.2d 35 (1959);
Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 II. 179, 138 N.E. 410 (1952).
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 30 (1979).
122. 291 Ill. at 222, 125 N.E. at 897.
123. See note 17 supra.
124. Id.
125. See United Cities Gas Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 48 Ill. 2d 36, 40, 268 N.E.2d 32, 34
(1971) (it is not necessary for the Commission to make a finding as to each evidentiary fact or
claim); Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31, 53, 25 N.E.2d 482, 494 (1939)
(the elements considered by the Commission were proper elements to be taken into con-
sideration for ratemaking purposes); Tarrel, supra note 10, at 788.
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mission's order would stand if, first, consideration had been given to all rel-
evant elements, and, second, the result was reasonable in light of current
economic conditions. 126
Distortion of the flexible fair value guideline began with the Illinois Su-
preme Court decision of Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce
Commission. 127  The Illinois Bell court analyzed the reasonableness of the
Commission's order to cancel rate schedules filed by Illinois Bell. 128 After a
review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the Commission had
failed to consider all relevant factors 129 and remanded the case.
1 30
Although, on its face, the Illinois Bell decision comports with Illinois
law, 13 1 an analysis of the court's interpretation of the fair value guideline
reveals a distinct bias toward the interests of the utility and its investors.
This is apparent from the court's emphasis on the importance of using
business-oriented reproduction cost and reasonable return factors 132 in the
rate base determination, both of which precipitate increased utility rates.
Although the Illinois Bell court purported to follow the Springfield Gas
guideline, in fact, Illinois Bell's distinct subordination of the public interest
126. State Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 291
Ill. 209, 236, 125 N.E. 891, 907 (1919).
127. 414 I11. 275, 111 N.E.2d 329 (1963).
128. Id. at 283, 111 N.E.2d at 334. Illinois Bell was a consolidated case which also involved a
jurisdictional question raised by the City of Chicago under § 67 of the Public Utilities Act
(currently codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 71 (1979)). Section 67 stated that a utility's
request for a rehearing by the Commission regarding application of a modified or rescinded
order does not preclude the utility from filing a petition setting up a different set of facts after
two years and again invoking Commission action. Id. The City interpreted the Act to have
created a two-year period of repose during which a utility could not file new rate schedules. 414
I11. at 278, 111 N.E.2d at 331. Thus, the City claimed that the Commission should have can-
celled the rate schedules filed with it by Illinois Bell because less than two years had elapsed
since the last rate order had been entered. Id. The court relied on 30 years of judicial con-
struction of § 67 to affirm the Commission's jurisdiction, Id. at 279, 111 N.E.2d at 332.
129. 414 Ill. at 290, 111 N.E.2d at 337. The court stated that the Commission had failed to
consider current economic conditions, present price levels and reproduction costs. The court
held that the Commission erred in not filing a complete record of the hearing indicating factors
it had considered, but had rejected. ld. at 288, 111 N.E.2d at 336. The record indicated
specific findings only on those factors to which the Commission gave weight in its final computa-
tion. Id. Thus, the edited record gave the appearance of Commission neglect to consider all
relevant factors. See State Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas &
Elec. Co., 291 Ill. 209, 233, 236, 125 N.E. 891, 905, 907 (1919).
130. 414 I11. at 291, 111 N.E.2d at 337-38.
131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 72 (1979). The Illinois Bell court acted within the judicial
bounds of review when it focused on the reasonableness and the lawfulness of the Commission's
order. Illinois case law requires that Illinois courts follow the fair value guideline as formulated
in Springfield Gas. See note 17 supra. Because there was no indication in the Commission's
record that the guideline had been followed, the Commission appeared to have failed to follow
precedent.
132. 414 111. at 287-89, 111 N.E.2d at 335-37. The Illinois Bell court paid lip service to the
need to balance consumer and utility interests, but proceeded to emphasize the importance of
maintaining the confidence of investors and utility companies in their financial endeavors. Id.
1980] UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY 1135
distorted the guideline's basic principles. 133  Forcing the Commission to use
factors which it found not conducive to setting a reasonable rate upset the
delicate balance between conflicting utility and consumer interests.
Distortion of the guideline continued with the Illinois Supreme Court de-
cision in City of Alton v. Commerce Commission.1 34  In City of Alton, the
Commission and the utility company claimed that the circuit court had ex-
ceeded its proper scope of review by inquiring into the elements of the
Commission's factual determinations rather than confining its review to the
reasonableness of the result.135  In defense of the circuit court's approach,
the supreme court stated that in order to make a sound and complete
analysis of the Commission's order, the factual determinations made by the
Commission must be analyzed. 136 This manner of review not only violated
the Public Utilities Act, 13 7 but also contradicted the mandates of Springfield
Gas, 138 a case which the City of Alton court cited as precedent. 139 The
court completely overlooked the facts that the Commission's function is to
make factual determinations regarding the elements of the fair value
guideline, and that the court's function is only to see that these elements
were considered. 140
With the City of Alton decision, the erosion of the fair value guideline was
nearly complete. The guideline's inherent flexibility, integral to maintaining
133. 291 Ill. 209, 125 N.E. 891 (1919). The Springfield Gas court stated:
[The Commission] sits to administer justice to individual and corporation, the weak,
the strong, the poor, the wealthy, indifferently, fearing none and fawning on none.
The notion that Commissions of this kind should be closely restricted by the courts
and that justice in our day can only be had in the courts is not conducive to the
best results .... The necessity of public regulation of rates arises out of the
monopoly of the public service company . . . and the [inability of] the individual
consumer ... to contract on equal contract terms.
Id. at 218, 125 N.E. at 899.
134. 19 Ill. 2d 76, 165 N.E.2d 513 (1960).
135. Id. at 80, 165 N.E.2d at 516.
136. Id. The City of Alton court cited Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 II1. 31,
25 N.E.2d 482 (1939), as precedent for its decision. Slattery, however, is fundamentally
distinguishable from City of Alton. Slattery concerned a charge of confiscatory rates, id. at 35,
25 N.E.2d at 486, whereas City of Alton concerned a charge of unreasonable rates. 19 Ill. 2d at
78, 165 N.E.2d at 515. This distinction is important because the scope of judicial review differs
for each charge. When the charge is confiscatory rates, the utility is entitled to the independent
judgment of the court on questions of law and fact. See BAUER & GOLD, supra note 2, at 134.
Denial of review is a violation of the guaranty of due process under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. See id.; Benjamin, Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudication: Some Recent
Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 (1948). In comparison,
the scope of judicial review for a claim of unreasonable rates is limited to a review of evidence
in the record and the findings of the Commission are to be presumed correct. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 111%, § 72 (1979).
137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/, § 72 (1979). See notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
138. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
139. 19 III. 2d at 81, 165 N.E.2d at 517.
140. See State Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co.,
291 II. 209, 236, 125 N.E. 891, 902 (1919). See generally PRIEST, supra note 36, at 434-37.
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a balance between public and utility interests, was eliminated by Illinois
Bell's mandate that reproduction cost factors cannot be set aside in rate base
determinations. 142 City of Alton, 143 in turn, broadened the judicial scope of
review to allow courts to examine the elements of ratemaking and make
their own findings of fact. 1 4 4 Both Illinois Bell and City of Alton cited
Springfield Gas as precedent, yet both distorted its holding to the point of
clearly violating its principles. The Union Electric court continued this dis-
tortion by claiming adherence to the fair value guideline, while, in fact,
advocating a formula that resulted in judicial ratemaking. 145
The Union Electric court would not have reached this result if it had re-
viewed the actual Springfield Gas opinion and not relied upon distorted
interpretations. Unlike its progeny, the Springfield Gas court was firm in its
statement that utility ratemaking is a legislative, not a judicial function. 1 46 It
was equally firm in holding that the court is not to review the Commission's
factual determinations on the separate elements of value. Instead, the court
stated, it must limit review to a determination of the reasonableness of the
final result. 147 In direct violation of these affirmations, the Union Electric
court overstepped the bounds of judicial review and stated that the primary
issue was the validity of elements used by the Commission in establishing
the rate bases for Union Electric and Illinois Bell.
Legislative Assent Through Inaction
In addition to stare decisis, the Union Electric court relied upon the pre-
sumption of acquiescence doctrine 148 in rendering its decision. This doctrine
implies passive agreement from a lack of active disagreement.149 In Union
Electric, the court reasoned that because the legislature had never amended
the Public Utilities Act to contradict the Springfield Gas construction of
"value" as the term appears in section 30 of the Act, i50 the legislature must
therefore approve of the construction and its implementing guideline.151
Considering the court's distortion of the Springfield Gas holding, however,
legislative acquiescence to the original fair value guideline does not infer
acquiescence to Union Electric's fair value formula. There are, in fact, sev-
141. 414 II1. 275, 111 N.E.2d 329 (1953).
142. See notes 127-133 and accompanying text supra.
143. 19 Il1. 2d 76, 165 N.E.2d 513 (1960).
144. See notes 134-140 and accompanying text supra.
145. See Union Elec. Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 64 I11. App. 3d 700, 711, 381 N.E.2d 1002,
1010 (3d Dist. 1978).
146. 291 III. at 213, 125 N.E. at 894. The court stated: "'The law is settled in this state that
the matter of rate regulation is essentially one of legislative control. The fixing of rates is not a
judicial function .... Id.
147. Id. at 236, 125 N.E. at 902. This limitation is a reiteration of the scope of judicial review
stated in section 72 of the Public Utilities Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111%, § 72 (1979).
148. 77 I11. 2d at 380, 396 N.E.2d at 518.
149. See generally Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 11 (1966).
150. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111%, § 30 (1979). See notes 121-122 and accompanying text supra.
151. 77 I11. 2d at 375-76, 396 N.E.2d at 515-16.
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eral plausible explanations for the legislature's passive attitude other than
acquiescence. First, the legislature may be unaware of the conflict between
recent court and Commission decisions. 152 Second, inaction may be a con-
scious effort to "leave the problem fluid." 153 Third, the legislature may be
assenting to the fair value method by name, unaware of its substantive dis-
tortion.
The last explanation brings to light the problems inherent in mislabeling
ratemaking methods. In Union Electric, the Commission erred by labeling
its rate base method as "original cost."154 By doing so, it gave the impres-
sion of blatantly operating contrary to Illinois law, which mandates the fair
value method. 155 In fact, the Commission followed the Springfield Gas fair
value guideline: it considered all relevant factors and applied to each the
weight it judged would result in a fair return. 156 Thus, no weight was given
to reproduction cost evidence 157 and emphasis was shifted to the original
cost factors. 158 In analyzing the Commission's rate base method, the su-
preme court focused narrowly on two aspects. First, weight had been given
by the Commission to original cost and not to reproduction cost. Second,
the Commission labeled its method as "original cost." Consequently, without
fully appreciating the intricacies of the fair value process, the court held that
the Commission's order was contrary to Illinois law. 159 In dismissing the
Commission's claim that by considering relevant elements it had followed
the fair value method, 160 the Union Electric court gave added momentum to
the adoption of a strict rate base formula.
Contrary to the Union Electric court's rationale, legislative acquiescence to
the Springfield Gas construction of "value" supports the Commission's rate
base method and not the method mandated by the Union Electric court.
When both methods are stripped of their respective labels and examined
substantively, it becomes clear that the Commission adhered to the original
fair value guideline while the court imposed a restrictive judicial formula.
CONCLUSION
In violation of the express provisions of the Public Utilities Act, Union
Electric continues the Illinois Supreme Court's reversion to the judicial
152. See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
181-82 (1975).
153. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946).
154. 77 I11. 2d at 378, 396 N.E.2d at 517.
155. See State Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co.,
291 11. 209, 125 N.E. 891 (1919); note 17 supra.
156. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
157. Union Elec. Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 64 I11. App. 3d 700, 704, 381 N.E.2d 1002,
1005 (3d Dist. 1978).
158. Id. at 704, 381 N.E.2d at 1005. See note 37 supra.
159. 77 I11. 2d at 379, 396 N.E.2d at 517.
160. Id. at 516.
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phase of utility rate regulation. Rather than illustrating any possible merit in
such a regression, the Union Electric decision exemplifies why the judiciary
should not get involved in the highly technical factual determinations of
ratemaking. 161
The decision is a morass of superficial reasoning, with more quotations
than substantive analysis. Indicative of this superficiality is the court's per-
functory dismissal of the United States Supreme Court's deferential attitude
toward regulatory agencies as being contrary to Illinois precedent. 162  The
Union Electric court failed to realize that the deferential stance it ignored
was expressly advocated by Springfield Gas, the case upon which it most
strongly relied. 163
In addition, throughout the opinion, the court presented contradictory
interpretations of the term "fair value,"164 indicating an unfamiliarity with
the basic terminology of ratemaking. Contrary to the principles upon which
the term was originally construed, 1 65 "fair value" has, through the court's
analysis, become synonymous with "market value" rather than "reasonable
result."
Procedurally, as well as practically, public utility ratemaking is not suited
to the judicial process. It is an area that must remain flexible so as to adjust
to the changing demands of an unpredictable economy. Stare decisis, which
the Union Electric court found conclusive of the issue, is inherently in con-
flict with this need. 166 By contrast, the Commission's ad hoc decision-
161. See Steenerson v. Great Northern R.R., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N.W. 713 (1897). In Steener-
son, Justice Canty vividly expressed the reason for judicial non-interference in Commission
decision-making:
How is a judge who's not supposed to have any of this special learning or experi-
ence, and could not take judicial notice of it if he had it, to review the decision of
commissions who should have it, and should act upon it? It seems to us that a judge
is not fit to act in such a matter.
Id. at 377, 72 N.W. at 716.
162. 77 II1. 2d at 371-72, 396 N.E.2d at 514. The court offered no explanation for its dismis-
sal of the federal court trend other than an absolute desire to follow stare decisis. The Union
Electric court simply stated: "[T]his court has adhered to the fair value approach despite the
demise of Symth v. Ames in the Federal Courts." Id.
163. See notes 117-126 and accompanying text supra.
164. 77 Il. 2d at 370-80, 396 N.E.2d at 513-18. The court demonstrated its confusion as to
the substantive meaning of the term "fair value" when it repeatedly changed the context of its
reference to the term throughout its opinion. The following examples illustrate the court's in-
consistent use of the term: (1) " 'fair-value' approach", id. at 370, 396 N.E.2d at 513;
(2) "fair-value rule", id. at 371, 396 N.E.2d at 513; (3) "fair-value principle", id.; (4) "fair-value
method", id. at 372, 396 N.E.2d at 514; (5) "present fair value of utility property", id. at 374,
396 N.E.2d at 515 (quoting Public Utilities Comn'n v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 291 Ill.
209, 213 (1919)); (6) "fair-value rate base", 77 I11. 2d at 374, 396 N.E.2d at 515; (7) "fair-value
standard", id. at 377, 396 N.E.2d at 516; and, finally, (8) the term is referred to as a "highly
technical term of art", id. Considering the various uses of the term, the last reference is indeed
ironic. A term of art by definition is definitive in its use. The Union Electric court's vacillating
use of "fair-value" is clearly not definitive.
165. See notes 121-122 and accompanying text supra.
166. See note 99 supra.
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making process 167 is perfectly attuned to it. Public utility ratemaking is an
area in need of prompt and preventive, rather than remedial, action. 1 68  A
successful consumer appeal of exorbitant rates does not result in retroactive
rebate to the consumer. 1 69 Consumer protection must come, therefore, be-
fore the rates are put into effect. When the Commission's preventive mea-
sures infringe upon property rights, or otherwise fail, the injured party has
the right to appeal. 1 70 This judicial review functions as the check on ad-
ministrative power. The review, in turn, is expressly limited by statutory
provisions. Thus, if a court's check becomes instead a substitution of its own
factual determination for that of a commission, it has operated contrary to
statutory law and usurped the administrative function. The difference be-
tween a check on power and the usurpation of it is the difference between
Springfield Gas and Union Electric.
Kathleen Curtin Schneider
167. See Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Commerce Comm'n, 1 111. 2d 509, 116 N.E.2d 394
(1953). Commission proceedings have only quasi-judicial effect and may be altered when cir-
cumstances require. Id. at 513, 116 N.E.2d at 397.
168. See generally DiCKINSON, supra note 2, at 12 & n.2.
169. See generally Levin, supra note 38, at 261.
170. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 72 (1979).

